
The Difference Between Communal and Exchange Relationships: What It Is and Is Not

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Replying to Batson (this issue), who argues that the difference between communal and exchange relationships is less than might be imagined, the authors review the communal/exchange distinction, discuss what it does and does not mean, and address specific issues raised by Batson. They conclude, contrary to claims by Batson, that (a) ingratiation cannot account for all the findings supporting the communal/exchange distinction; (b) if desire for a communal relationship leads to ingratiation, that does not contradict the distinction; (c) if communal norms are followed for other than altruistic reasons, that does not undermine the distinction, (d) the difference between communal and exchange relationships is not limited to the breadth of benefits exchanged; (e) the difference between communal and exchange relationships is not limited to a difference in etiquette; rather, the communal/exchange distinction provides a theoretical explanation for the difference in etiquette.

The article by Batson (this issue) poses the question: What is the difference between communal and exchange relationships? The question refers to the communal/exchange distinction of Clark and Mills (1979). The answer given by Batson is that the difference is far less than might be imagined. Batson concludes that exchange principles seem to operate in both exchange and communal relationships, with the difference limited to a difference in the breadth and etiquette of benefits exchanged.

We agree with some of Batson's comments. However, we disagree with others and his conclusions about the communal/exchange distinction. Our response has two parts. In the first, we present a more complete answer to the question of the difference between communal and exchange relationships than is attributed to us in Batson's article.¹ We also discuss what the communal/exchange distinction does not mean. The second part of

our response addresses the specific issues raised in Batson's article.

THE COMMUNAL/EXCHANGE DISTINCTION

What Is the Communal/Exchange Distinction?

As Batson correctly stated,² the distinction between communal and exchange relationships is based on the rules or norms that govern the giving and receiving of benefits. In exchange relationships, benefits are given with the expectation of receiving a comparable benefit in return or as repayment for a benefit received previously. In contrast, the norm in communal relationships is to give benefits in response to needs or to demonstrate a general concern for the other person. In communal relationships, the receipt of a benefit does not change the recipient's obligation to respond to the other's needs. It does not create a specific debt or obligation to return a comparable benefit, as it does in an exchange relationship.

There is more to the communal/exchange distinction than is contained in the summary given by Batson. At the beginning of our work on the communal/exchange distinction, our focus was on communal relationships that are mutual (Clark & Mills, 1979). Later (Mills & Clark, 1988), we discussed one-sided communal relationships,

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such as the relationship between a parent and an infant or young child. We noted that caring for infants and young children, which is essential for human survival, is the clearest example of a communal relationship. We speculated that the human tendency to form communal relationships has a biological basis.

The communal norm of caring for the needs of the child functions to improve the chances of the offspring's survival. It also facilitates the child's sense of security and may satisfy nurturance needs on the part of the parent-caretaker, thereby furnishing an important sense of fulfillment. In mutual communal relationships, such as relationships between adult family members and between friends, following the communal norm of taking care of the needs of one another can provide each member of the relationship with a sense both of security and of fulfillment. We believe that, for most people, their communal relationships are the relationships that are most important for them (Mills & Clark, 1982).

An important feature of the communal/exchange distinction not mentioned by Batson is that communal relationships can vary in strength (Mills & Clark, 1982, 1988).³ The greater the motivation to be responsive to the other person's needs, the stronger the communal relationship. For instance, the communal relationship with one's best friend is typically stronger than that with one's other friends. The communal relationship with one's child is typically stronger than that with one's best friend.

Communal relationship strength can be described in a number of ways. One way is in terms of the costs the person is willing to incur to meet the other's needs, without expecting specific compensation. Typically, people are willing to incur greater costs to meet the needs of their child than to meet the needs of their best friend. As costs are usually related to the size of the benefit given, larger benefits are usually given in stronger communal relationships. Another way to describe communal relationship strength is in terms of whose needs take precedence in case of a conflict. Assuming needs are equal, the needs of the person with whom one has a stronger communal relationship take precedence over the needs of the person with whom one has a weaker communal relationship.

Figure 1 illustrates how the degree of strength of the communal relationship with the other and the degree of cost of providing a benefit to the other determine when the communal norm will be applied.⁴ When the communal norm will be applied is also determined by the degree of the other's need for the benefit from the person. The greater the other's need, the more likely it is the communal norm will be applied.

We believe most people consider themselves to have weak communal relationships with everyone (Mills & Clark, 1982). Most people are willing to provide aid to a




Figure 1 When the Communal norm will be applied as a function of communal relationship strength and cost of the benefit. (The placement of stranger, friend, best friend, and child on the communal relationship strength axis is for illustrative purposes only.)

stranger at some degree of cost to themselves without any expectation of repayment, if the stranger has a need for their aid that is great relative to its cost. An example is calling an ambulance for a stranger who has collapsed in front of one's house. Even when the need is not great, aid will be given to a stranger without any expectation of repayment if the cost is very low, such as giving a stranger directions.

Although communal relationships are pervasive, strong communal relationships are rare except in the case of family members, romantic partners, and close friends. The weak communal relationships most people have with strangers and acquaintances do not provide the degree of motivation sufficient for the giving of costly benefits, except under unusual emergency conditions involving extraordinary need. The regular giving of costly benefits to persons other than family members, romantic partners, or friends required for the functioning of a modern economy is outside the realm of communal relationships.

The social process enabling the regular giving of costly benefits in the absence of strong communal relationships which is essential to a modern economy involves the trading of benefits. Trading entails the expectation of receiving something specific of value in return for providing a benefit. The orderly trading of costly benefits that forms the basis of a modern market economy depends on the exchange norm that the receipt of a benefit incurs an obligation to return a com-

parable benefit. The plethora of products currently available to consumers would not have been produced in the absence of the exchange rule that a specific benefit is owed in return for a benefit received.

To avoid confusion, it is important to keep in mind that we use the term *exchange* in accord with the dictionary definition of exchange as giving or taking one thing in return for another. The term *exchange* has been used rather broadly in social psychology to refer to mutually rewarding interaction. Our use of the term is narrower, and, we believe, more precise. In our view, an exchange occurs when the parties involved understand that one benefit is given in return for another benefit.

What the Communal/Exchange Distinction Does Not Mean

The communal/exchange distinction does not have the same meaning as the difference between close and casual relationships, as Batson assumes. It is not our view that the difference between communal and exchange relationships exhausts the psychological difference in being close.

We assume that a relationship in which the communal norm is followed is more likely to be regarded as a close relationship than a relationship in which the communal norm is not followed. In fact, in some recent work we have found that a measure of communal relationship strength is highly correlated with a rating of the subjective closeness of the relationship with the other person (Mills, Clark, & Ford, 1993). However, there are other factors that may cause a person to feel close to another person, such as the degree of shared knowledge or experience.

If, as we assume, people have weak communal relationships with strangers, it follows that they have some communal relationships that would not be considered close relationships. Aiding a stranger without any expectation of repayment—for example, giving a stranger directions—is an example of a communal relationship, albeit a very weak communal relationship. Such a relationship would not be thought of as close.

Although many exchange relationships would be considered casual relationships, an exchange relationship is not always casual. Exchange relationships can continue over a long period and can be quite important to the parties involved. An example of an exchange relationship that would not be considered casual is the relationship between partners in a business.

An issue related to whether communal relationships are close relationships and exchange relationships are casual relationships is whether communal relationships are just long-term exchange relationships. As Batson correctly stated, we do *not* believe communal relationships are just long-term exchange relationships. As Batson acknowledged, certain of our findings (Clark, 1984; Clark, Mills, & Corcoran, 1989; Clark, Mills, & Powell,

1986) are difficult to reconcile with an extended-time-frame exchange explanation. We have pointed out (Mills & Clark, 1982, 1988) that exchange relationships may continue over a long period, as in the example given above of an exchange relationship between partners in a business.⁵ We also noted that the variables of communal versus exchange relationship and the expected length of the relationship are conceptually independent.

The communal/exchange distinction is also different from a distinction between altruistic and selfish relationships. As Batson correctly notes, we do not assume that communal relationships are altruistic and exchange relationships are selfish, as is sometimes thought. Nor, however, do we assume that communal relationships are not altruistic, as Batson suggested we do.⁶

In response to criticism that the communal/exchange distinction assumes people are more unselfish than is warranted, we pointed out that behavior in communal relationships can be selfish in the sense that people may follow communal norms in order to achieve some other goal (Mills & Clark, 1988). Our position that it is not necessary to assume that behavior in communal relationships is completely unselfish does *not* mean, as Batson assumed, that we regard it as completely or even primarily selfish. Both communal and exchange relationships assume a willingness to meet one's obligations to the other person. Exploiting the other by failing to meet one's obligations in *either* type of relationship is truly selfish behavior (Mills & Clark, 1988).⁷

The issue of altruism versus selfishness is not central to our work on the communal/exchange distinction, as it has been to much of Batson's own work (Batson, 1987; Batson & Oleson, 1991).⁸ We have, however, made predictions about the perception of altruism and selfishness from the concept of communal relationship strength (Mills, Clark, & Mehta, 1993). Because the expectation that help will be provided is greater in strong communal relationships, offering help to someone with whom there is a weak communal relationship (such as an acquaintance) leads to greater perceived altruism than offering help to someone with whom there is a strong communal relationship (such as a best friend or sibling). Conversely, failing to offer help in a strong communal relationship leads to greater perceived selfishness than failing to offer help in a weak communal relationship.

That people follow different norms governing the giving and receiving of benefits in communal and exchange relationships is what is central to the communal/exchange distinction.⁹ The reason that a person might follow the communal norm in a relationship can be considered separately from the consequences of following the communal norm. This is an important distinction. The motivation to follow the communal norm may be altruistic or selfish or unclassifiable. The conse-

quences of following the communal norm are that one is concerned with the welfare of the other person and motivated to benefit the other when the other has a need. For example, the motivation to follow the norm of a communal relationship that evokes the motivation to provide care for an aging relative without compensation may have been created by an altruistic desire. However, it also might have been created by a desire to fulfill one's duty or by some other reason.¹⁰

The communal/exchange distinction does not mean communal relationships exist without providing rewards to the members of the relationship. The assumption that a communal relationship does not involve an exchange of benefits (in the sense that a benefit is given with the expectation of receiving a comparable benefit in return) does not mean communal relationships are not rewarding to the participants. We assume that if a relationship continues, it is rewarding, unless there are restraints against leaving the relationship.

One reason a communal relationship can be rewarding without an exchange of benefits has to do with the fact that, in our theorizing about the communal/exchange distinction, benefits are not the same as rewards. We use the term *benefit* to refer to something that one person chooses to give to another which is of use to the person receiving it (Clark & Mills, 1979). There are many satisfactions or rewards that derive from relationships which are not benefits, as we use that term. For example, the joy a parent feels when a child recovers from an illness is not a benefit voluntarily given by the child to the parent. Simply knowing one has a mutual communal relationship with another person in which each person is concerned with the other's welfare can be highly satisfying. However, that does not, in itself, constitute a benefit, as we use the term.

Another reason communal relationships can be rewarding without an exchange of benefits has to do with an essential aspect of the communal/exchange distinction. The communal/exchange distinction makes a distinction between the giving and receiving of benefits and the exchange of benefits. The giving and receiving of benefits in communal relationships does not constitute an exchange of benefits, according to the communal/exchange distinction. Giving and receiving benefits is ubiquitous in communal relationships, providing innumerable rewards to members of those relationships.

A point made earlier is worth reiterating here. Although the term *exchange* has been used broadly in social psychology to refer to mutually rewarding interaction, we do not use the term in that way. Rather, we use it in accord with the dictionary definition of exchange as giving or taking one thing in return for another. For us, an exchange occurs when the parties involved understand that one benefit is given in return for another benefit.

ISSUES RAISED BY BATSON

Is Experimental Manipulation of Desire for a Communal Relationship Valid?

Batson questions the validity of the manipulation of desire for a communal relationship, asking whether responses to it can tell us anything about real, ongoing communal versus exchange relationships. Considered in that way,¹¹ the question is best answered, as Batson himself does, by looking at the results of parallel studies in which the effects of the desire for communal versus exchange relationship manipulation can be compared with behavior toward friends versus strangers (Clark, 1984; Clark et al., 1986, 1989; Clark & Taraban, 1991).

We agree with Batson's statement about the results of the parallel studies, "The results of the two studies in each pair have always been quite similar. Subjects induced to desire a communal relationship have behaved like ongoing friends; subjects induced to desire an exchange relationship have behaved like strangers."¹² We agree with his comment that "the consistency of results across these paired studies is reassuring." These statements seem to us to answer most satisfactorily the question posed by Batson.

We are aware that, in making those statements, Batson was not agreeing with us that the results of the parallel studies provide evidence for the communal/exchange distinction. Rather, he went on from those statements to raise the possibility that subtle exchange processes might be operating in the communal conditions of the laboratory studies and in the ongoing friendships. In his next section, he suggested that the subtle exchange processes involved ingratiation.

Can Ingratiation Account for All the Findings Supporting the Communal/Exchange Distinction?

Batson states that ingratiation seems able to account for the numerous empirical differences between communal and exchange subjects with comparative ease. We agree with Batson that subjects desiring a communal relationship with another person may want to make a favorable impression on that other person. If that is what is meant by ingratiation, we would agree that subjects desiring a communal relationships often follow an ingratiation strategy.¹³

We assume that subjects who want to create a favorable impression in order to further the development of a mutual communal relationship will take care to follow the rules of communal relationships with the other person so as to make a favorable impression. If that is ingratiation, then an interpretation in terms of ingratiation is similar to our interpretation in terms of the concept of a communal relationship. Many of the findings of the studies using the desire for communal rela-

tionship manipulation can be explained on that basis, but not all.

We also assume that subjects desiring a communal relationship with another person will avoid the appearance of following exchange rules with that person in order not to create the wrong impression. That kind of behavior is not what is meant by ingratiation. That is not behavior designed to impress or, as Batson also includes in his discussion of ingratiation, behavior designed to indebted.

Whichever definition of ingratiation is used, an ingratiation interpretation cannot plausibly account for the results of Clark (1984). In Study 1 of Clark (1984), whereas subjects desiring an exchange relationship with the other person followed an exchange rule by keeping track of the other's inputs into a joint task, subjects desiring a communal relationship avoided doing so in a situation in which the other had no way of knowing whether they were keeping track. Subjects desiring an exchange relationship were significantly more likely than chance to choose for their part of the task a different-color pen than the other person had used (thus enabling themselves to keep track of the other's inputs); subjects desiring a communal relationship were significantly less likely than chance to choose a different-color pen.¹⁴

Although, before presenting the ingratiation interpretation, Batson made reference to studies comparing behavior toward friends and strangers, he did not discuss how an ingratiation interpretation would explain those studies. It cannot account for the findings of Clark (1984) and of Clark et al. (1989) that keeping track of inputs into a joint task is less if the other person is a friend than if the other is a stranger.

In the study by Clark et al. (1989), keeping track of the other's inputs or needs was measured by the number of times subjects turned around to glance at lights (which never changed). When a change in the lights meant the other had made a substantial contribution to a joint task, the number of glances was less if the other was a friend than a stranger, whereas it was greater if the other was a friend than a stranger when a change in the lights meant the other needed help (which the subject could not provide). An ingratiation explanation would have to explain why not looking at the lights when a change meant the other had made a substantial contribution to the joint task (in a situation in which the other had no way of knowing whether the subject had looked at the lights) would be considered a means of ingratiating oneself with the other.¹⁵

If Desire for a Communal Relationship Leads to Ingratiation, Does That Contradict the Communal/Exchange Distinction?

Batson suggests that if subjects led to desire a communal relationship employ an ingratiation strategy, that

would contradict the claim of Clark and Mills that communal and exchange relations differ in that individuals in or desiring a communal relationship operate on a principle of concern, not a principle of exchange. Batson expresses doubt that we would agree, and his doubt is well-founded. We do not see any contradiction between assuming that (a) those desiring a mutual communal relationship will try to create a favorable impression on the other by following communal rules with the other and (b) following communal rules involves a concern for the other's welfare.

There is no contradiction between those two assumptions because, as we noted when discussing what the communal/exchange distinction does not mean, the motivation causing a person to follow the rules of a communal relationship is not necessarily the same as the motivation that is a consequence of following the rules of a communal relationship. The latter motivation involves a concern for the welfare of the other. The former motivation need not stem from a concern for the welfare of the other, although it may.

Do Communal Relationships Evoke Altruistic Motivation? If Communal Norms Are Followed for Other Than Altruistic Reasons, Does That Undermine the Communal/Exchange Distinction?

Batson states that Clark and Mills do not wish to claim that communal relationships evoke altruistic motivation. From our position that people in communal relationships may follow the norm of showing concern for the other's welfare in order to achieve some other goal, Batson further concludes that our analysis of possible motives for benefiting the other in communal relationships seems quite consistent with exchange or equity theory explanations.

Contrary to Batson's statement about our views, we do wish to claim that communal relationships evoke altruistic motivation, in the sense of motivation directed toward increasing the other's welfare.¹⁶ We agree with the authors quoted by Batson who have argued that love relations have the capacity to evoke altruistic motivation. Our view is that communal relationships do evoke motives directed toward increasing the other's welfare. But it is also our view that that is not the same as saying people enter into or continue in communal relationships solely for altruistic reasons.

As discussed in connection with the issue of whether ingratiation would undermine the communal/exchange distinction, the motivation that leads people to follow the norms of communal relationships need not be the same as the motivation that is evoked by the norms of communal relationships. That people follow communal norms for other than altruistic reasons does not contradict our assumption that communal relationships evoke

a concern for the welfare of the other person and differ from exchange relationships.

Is the Difference Between Communal and Exchange Relationships the Breadth of Benefits Exchanged?

Batson's conclusion is that the difference between communal and exchange relationships seems limited to a difference in the breadth and etiquette of benefits exchanged. The issue of a difference in etiquette is different from the issue of the breadth of benefits exchanged and is addressed in the next section.

The issue of the breadth of benefits exchanged could be considered in terms of whether the benefits that are given and received in communal relationships cover a wider range than the benefits given and received in exchange relationships. If the issue is considered in that way, we would disagree that the benefits given and received cover a broader range in communal relationships than in exchange relationships. It is difficult to think of a benefit that can be given and received in a communal relationship that cannot also be given and received in an exchange relationship, by purchase or barter. Of course, in some cases the exchange may be considered immoral, illegal, or strange. For example, receiving money for engaging in sex is generally regarded as immoral and is illegal in most parts of the United States. Buying an invitation to a party is strange and socially inappropriate.

When Batson discusses the issue of breadth of benefits exchanged, he focuses on the comparability of the benefits that are given and received. He states that the difference between communal and exchange relationships appears to reduce to a difference in the range of benefits considered comparable, making the assumption that the range is greater in communal relationships. We do not agree with that, because our position is that benefits given and received in communal relationships are not viewed as part of an exchange and so their comparability is not evaluated in communal relationships.

Contrary to Batson's statement about our position, we do not believe that comparable value of benefits in exchange relationships is restricted to similarity in kind or in explicit value. We agree with Batson that comparable value of benefits exchanged for one another may include comparability on a more general, subjective scale of value. We believe there are situations in which very subjective scales of value are utilized in exchanges of benefits. For instance, we can envision two neighbors agreeing to an exchange in which the first gives the second vegetables from the first's garden and the second give the first rides to the post office.

In connection with his comments about the comparable worth of benefits, Batson suggests that exchange is less tangible and less explicit in communal relationships than in exchange relationships. As we noted when dis-

cussing what the communal/exchange distinction does not mean, our view is that an exchange of benefits does not occur unless the persons involved recognize that what is given and received is an exchange of benefits. If the value of the "benefits" is so inexplicit, so intangible, that the parties do not recognize them as benefits that are being given and received for each other, then an exchange of benefits has not occurred, as we use that term. We doubt that creating a favorable impression with a person with whom one desires a mutual communal relationship by following the rules of a communal relationship with that person, or ingratiation as the term is used in this article, is perceived by many as an exchange of benefits.¹⁷

Yet another reason we disagree with Batson's conclusion that the difference between communal and exchange relationships can be reduced to a difference in the breadth of what are considered comparable benefits is that that assumption is not able to account for some of the findings supporting the communal/exchange distinction. That assumption cannot explain the results of the studies by Clark (1984) and by Clark et al. (1989), discussed in connection with the ingratiation interpretation. If that assumption were correct, there should be no reason to expect that keeping track of inputs into a joint task will be less when a communal relationship is desired than when an exchange relationship is desired or less when the other is a friend than when the other is a stranger.

Is the Difference Between Communal and Exchange Relationships a Difference in Etiquette?

Batson suggests that in a communal relationship the exchange is not as explicit or blatant, and as a result, the etiquette differs. He further suggests that if that is so, an exchange explanation cannot clearly be distinguished from our own theoretical perspective, quoting from Clark, Ouellette, Powell, and Milberg (1987) in a way that implies we agree with him. We do agree with Batson that the etiquette differs in communal and exchange relationships. We do not agree that the blatancy of the exchange is the reason the etiquette differs. And we do not agree that our theoretical perspective cannot be distinguished from Batson's exchange interpretation.

We agree with Batson's comment concerning etiquette, that it is appropriate for a lawyer to send a bill but not appropriate to ask a date to pay for dinner with affection or for communal subjects to ask directly for liking in exchange for helping. That comment raises the question: If in each case the benefit was given in exchange for a future benefit, why is it appropriate to ask for the (future) benefit in the first case but not in the others? Why does the etiquette differ? Why is blatancy allowed in one case but not in the others?

From the perspective of the exchange interpretation favored by Batson, the etiquette or code of manners governing social conduct in communal and exchange relationships is arbitrary. It just happens that blatancy is allowed in one case and not in the others. From the perspective of the communal/exchange distinction, the reason the etiquette differs is that the norms governing the giving and receiving of benefits are different in communal and exchange relationships. Asking for a benefit following the receipt of a benefit is likely to be viewed as treating the matter as an exchange and hence will be avoided if a communal relationship exists or is desired.

Some years ago, we began a chapter on the communal/exchange distinction (Mills & Clark, 1982) with an example involving etiquette as a way of illustrating the distinction. The example posed the question of why a merchant would be expected to apologize if the price tag were missing from an item for sale and also to apologize if the price tag were not missing from the same item after it was gift-wrapped. We pointed out that the differences in social norms or etiquette illustrated by the price tag example could not be explained from the perspective of theories that assume all social relationships are based on exchange. Such differences can, however, be explained by the communal/exchange distinction. Price tags are removed from gifts because they emphasize the cost of the benefit given, which is inappropriate in a communal relationship because it gives the appearance that the gift giver regards the benefit as part of an exchange. From our perspective, the differences in etiquette in communal and exchange relationships are no accident but, rather, reflect important underlying differences in communal and exchange norms.

CONCLUSIONS

A careful examination of the communal/exchange distinction, we believe, leads to the conclusion that it is psychologically important. Communal relationships are essential for the survival of infants and young children, and they can provide a sense of security and fulfillment not furnished by exchange relationships. Although exchange relationships are essential for the functioning of a modern economy, for most people communal relationships are the relationships that are the most important.

Parsimony, as expressed in a quotation attributed to Einstein, "Everything should be made as simple as possible but not simpler," is on the side of the communal/exchange distinction. Contrary to the claim of Batson, ingratiation cannot account for all the findings supporting the communal/exchange distinction. Batson's claims that if desire for a communal relationship leads to ingratiation, that would contradict the distinction,

and if communal norms are followed for other than altruistic reasons, that would undermine the distinction, are not warranted, because the motivation to follow the communal norm is not necessarily the same as the motivation that is evoked by following the communal norm. Contrary to Batson's claim, the difference between communal and exchange relationships is not limited to the breadth of benefits exchanged. Etiquette is different in communal and exchange relationships, not by accident, but, rather, because the norms are different in communal and exchange relationships.

We fear that a failure to make a distinction between communal and exchange relationships would deprive us of a useful conceptual tool for understanding the giving and receiving of benefits and of a fruitful source of empirically testable ideas about social relationships. It would confront us with the question of how to explain a variety of important social phenomena. Why do the differences in etiquette described by Batson exist? Why is keeping track of inputs into joint tasks less in communal relationships than in exchange relationships? Why is the motivation to meet the needs of another person greater in some instances (e.g., one's child) than in other instances (e.g., an acquaintance)? Why will parents provide extensive care for a severely retarded child who is unable to give them any repayment, while others are unwilling to do the same for that child?

NOTES

1. Although our focus is on communal and exchange relationships, we recognize there are other kinds of relationships as well. As in previous articles (Mills & Clark, 1982, 1986), we will refer to exploitative relationships, in which one person seeks as many benefits from another person as possible without any sense of obligation either to meet the needs of the other or to repay the other for the specific benefits received.

2. In the interest of focusing on the major issues, we will not review the various instances in Batson's article in which language is attributed to us which we did not actually use and to which we would not subscribe. One such instance is in the abstract of his article. Batson states (referring to us), "They say that benefits in communal relationships may be bestowed with an eye to gaining self-benefits," language we never used that does not accurately state our view on the matter.

3. Another quantitative aspect of the communal/exchange distinction is the degree of certainty that one has a communal relationship or an exchange relationship with a given other person.

4. Figure 1 is based on ideas that appeared in references cited by Batson (Mills & Clark, 1982, 1988), although the figure itself did not appear in those references.

5. Another example is a long-term exchange relationship we know of in which an elderly woman with no children has willed a contractor her home in exchange for providing specified maintenance of the home and improvements to it during her lifetime.

6. Referring to our views, Batson states: "There is no claim that communal relationships necessarily evoke motives directed toward increasing the partner's welfare (i.e., altruistic motives). . . . Those psychologists who accused them of imputing altruistic motives to individuals in or desiring a communal relationship simply misunderstood."

7. We also noted that violations of communal and exchange norms do not disprove the existence of those norms, because the meaning of a social norm includes the possibility that some behavior does not

conform to the norm. In another article we have analyzed similarities and differences in exploitation in communal and exchange relationships (Mills & Clark, 1986).

8. We suspect Batson's critique was stimulated by the realization that our work does not help resolve the issue of major concern to Batson of whether people are capable of motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else (Batson & Oleson, 1991). Although that might be an important issue, we have not been concerned with it in our work on the communal/exchange distinction, nor have we ever claimed our work was useful in resolving it.

9. We do not assume people are explicitly aware of the communal/exchange distinction or are able to describe how it affects their reactions (Clark & Mills, 1979). We assume they follow the rules of communal and exchange relationships in the same way that they follow the rules of grammar when speaking, without necessarily being aware of the content of the rules or even that they are following rules.

10. A nanny-child relationship is an example of a communal relationship in which the motivation to follow the communal norm is clearly not altruistic. The nanny receives money and/or other benefits from the child's parents in return for which the nanny is obligated to care for the needs of the child. The exchange relationship between the nanny and the child's parents provides the basis for the one-sided communal relationship the nanny has with the child.

11. The question could also be considered in terms of whether the experimental manipulation is valid in the sense that it actually does manipulate the desire for a communal versus an exchange relationship. Evidence that it does is presented in Clark (1986).

12. We do not assume that the effects of desire for a communal versus an exchange relationship will always be the same as the effects of an ongoing communal relationship versus an ongoing exchange relationship. For example, the tendency to avoid behaving in a way that might be interpreted as following the exchange norm is greater in a new communal relationship about which there is uncertainty than in a well-established relationship (Clark, 1984).

13. Jones (1964) defined ingratiation as a class of strategic behaviors illicitly designed to influence a particular other person concerning the attractiveness of one's personal qualities. When discussing ingratiation, Batson uses the words *to indebted* as well as the words *to impress*. If ingratiation includes illicitly designed behavior or behavior designed to indebted, we would *not* agree that subjects desiring a communal relationship employ an ingratiation strategy.

14. Batson's suggestion that the results for the communal subjects can be attributed to their being more focused on doing well on their part of the task lacks plausibility. The choice of which pen the subject would use occurred before the subject began working on the task, and the choice of a pen does not require much focus. Even if the communal subjects were distracted by a focus on the upcoming task, that should produce random choices rather than the obtained result of fewer choices of the different-color pen than expected by chance.

15. The results cannot be attributed to a difference in focus on the subject's task, because the measure was obtained before the subject received the task, while the subject was waiting alone, having been told to relax and having been provided with magazines to read.

16. This definition of altruistic motivation used by Batson in his comments about the communal/exchange distinction is not precisely

the same as the definition of altruism he has used in describing his own research (Batson & Oleson, 1991)—that is, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else.

17. Except by those who have taken social psychology from an exchange theorist.

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